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Question At Issue:
the appropriate rate of Pay- Related Social Insurance (PRSI) contribution due in respect of the employment of a person in the appellant’s medical practice in the period September 2007 to November 2008.
Background:
A doctor, N, worked at a Health
Care Centre for the period September 2007 to
November 2008. The appellant, another doctor
and a sole trader, indicated that he was
approached by N, an EU citizen, as she wished to
gain practice and experience working as a GP in
the Irish health care system. His practice had
provided such opportunities for other doctors in
the past, and he agreed.
After a time, N appointed a solicitor to
investigate the arrangements which applied to her
work at the practice and a decision on her
insurability status was sought from the
Department of Social Protection. Social Welfare
Inspectors interviewed both parties to obtain
details of the employment. Their reports were
made available to a Deciding Officer, who
determined as follows:
______The employment of N by C during the period
specified was insurable under the Social
Welfare Acts at PRSI Class A provided
reckonable earnings are €38 or more per
week.
The appellant appealed the decision on grounds
that N was a self-employed operator.
Oral Hearing:
The appellant attended,
accompanied by the practice secretary. The
Social Welfare Inspector and the Deciding
Officer attended, at the request of the Appeals
Officer. The PRSI status of N was at issue and
she had been summoned as a witness but failed to
attend. It was agreed to proceed without her.
The Appeals Officer advised, however, that
should it transpire that a revised decision in
favour of the appellant was contemplated, he
would write to N to afford her an opportunity to
comment beforehand. The appellant wished it
noted that N had similarly failed to attend a
Labour Relations hearing and that he had taken
time off from his practice to attend.
The Deciding Officer was invited to set out the
decision and to outline the grounds on which he
had relied. He spoke of the general conditions
which apply in determining whether a contract of
service or a contract for services applies,
referring to contract law and precedent cases. He
highlighted the following as indicative of a
contract of service in this case:
• N was under control and direction as to
when and how to do her work. A person
with specialist knowledge could be
employed under a contact of service and
there were many cases where this
occurred. Such a person could work with
quite an amount of freedom as to how to
do the work but could still be under
control and direction from the employer.
• She had no responsibility for the
management of the practice.
• She was paid a fixed wage and she could
not suffer a loss or make a gain depending
on the success of the practice. She was
not exposed to financial risk by her
involvement.
• She had to attend in person and was not
free to send a substitute.
The Deciding Officer made reference to a recent
finding of the Revenue Appeals Commissioners
where a doctor employed in an out-of-hours
service has been found to be insurable as an
employee.
In response, the appellant asserted that the
circumstances of an out-of-hours co-operative
were not comparable to his situation as they were
limited companies. He alluded to N’s position at
the start of the arrangement: her qualifications
were recognised in Ireland by virtue of EU
Regulations but she had no experience of general
practice in Ireland. The arrangement was solely
to afford her the opportunity to gain this
experience. He rejected the assertion that she
was an employee, indicating that the arrangement
was verbal with no written contract. He said that
N was well acquainted with similar arrangements
as she had worked in a self-employed capacity in
the US. He stated that both parties clearly
understood that she was to be a self-employed
operator at the start of the arrangement.
It was clarified that N attended the practice where
she saw both medical card and private patients;
she was expected to attend during normal
practice opening hours. It was agreed at the
commencement of the arrangement that she
would be paid a set amount, which rose to
€75,000 per annum over time; the amount was
not dependent on the number of patients seen.
The appellant asserted that N was a poor financial
manager and that it was agreed to pay her a set
amount to give stability and to bring a certainty
to her finances.
The appellant made reference to additional
earnings outside of the arrangement with the
practice. As N developed a profile, she began to
include her own private patients and she was free
to see these patients in the practice after normal
opening times; she was paid privately by these
patients. In addition, the practice was on call for
out-of-hours cover from time to time. N
provided cover at such times and was free to keep
any fees earned; it was clarified that this
arrangement applied to all doctors in the practice.
The appellant referred also to an arrangement
with the Gardaí to attend for drink driving cases.
When the practice was contacted and N attended,
she was free to keep half of the fee charged with
the other half going to the practice. The appellant
stated, however, that if the Gardaí contacted N
independently, she was free to retain the full fee.
The appellant stated that N, as is the case with all
practicing doctors, carried her own professional
indemnity insurance, she was registered with the
Medical Council and was personally responsible
to deal with any allegation of medical
malpractice. She was not required to have public
liability insurance, however, as all patients
attending the practice, including her private
patients attending after practice opening times,
were covered under the practice insurance.
The appellant asserted that the arrangement with
N was always viewed as temporary; she had
indicated that it was her intention to move on.
He said that the question of sending another
person to cover her attendance at the practice had
never arisen. While she often changed her
schedule, the practice secretary was informed and
it was her responsibility to arrange cover. He
said, however, that other doctors were free to
send their own substitutes if unable to attend and
that, had it arisen, N was free to do so also.
The appellant stated that the arrangement with N
was subject to regular review; as she became
more experienced, she became more valuable to
the practice and her earnings increased but her
hours of attendance reduced. He advised that any
instance of complaint would have been a matter
for the Medical Council. The arrangement could
have been terminated had it been found that there
was evidence of illegal or unprofessional
conduct.
The appellant concluded by saying that, in 15
years of practice, he had always understood that
doctors engaged in a similar fashion to N were
treated as self-employed and liable to manage
there own tax affairs, and that this arrangement
had always been accepted by the Revenue
Commissioners. He went on to outline the
consequences of the decision under appeal,
saying that if it were to be upheld, a significant
financial liability would arise. It was explained
that any liability arising was a matter for the
Department Of Social Protection and the
Revenue Commissioners.
In summary, the Deciding Officer alluded again
to a recent case where the Revenue Appeal
Commissioner found a doctor employed in an
out-of-hours co-operative to be insurable as an
employee. The appellant reiterated his view that
the case was not comparable as co-operatives
operated very fixed arrangements and did not
offer training or opportunities to improve
experience or earn additional income. It was
agreed, however, that the Deciding Officer would
make the text of that decision available to the
Appeals Officer and to the appellant for any
comment he might to make.
Further discussion:
An exchange of emails
followed the hearing. Details of the case referred
to by the Deciding Officer were clarified but he
indicated that he was not in a position to supply
the text of the decision made by the Revenue
Appeals Commission. As the text of that
decision was not available, the Appeals Officer
advised that he could not take account of the case
in reaching his decision. He noted also that the
question of the insurability of employment under
the Social Welfare Acts is a matter to be decided
by the appropriate officer of the Department of
Social Protection and that the findings of the
Revenue Appeals Commissioners were not,
therefore, relevant to the question and should not
be used as a precedent.
Consideration of the Appeals Officer:
The
Appeals Officer indicated that as N had failed to
attend the hearing and he did not have the benefit
of her oral evidence, he had relied on the
appellant’s account in relation to any points in
dispute. He noted that the appellant had
confirmed that N had been engaged by him, a
sole trader, to attend the practice at set hours, to
see patients of the practice and was paid a set
amount for her time and work. She was not in
any way involved in the management of the
practice, was not involved in any decisions
relating to the management of staff, equipment or
facilities.
The Appeals Officer noted also that N was
engaged for her skill as a doctor and as such was
not under control and direction as to how she
dealt with patients. While the evidence indicated
that she was engaged to gain experience, he
considered it reasonable to conclude that a certain
amount of monitoring of her performance would
have taken place particularly at the start of the
arrangement. He referred to the Deciding
Officer’s contention that persons with particular
skills, who would not be controlled and directed
in carrying out their specific duties could,
nevertheless, be subject to overall control and
direction as to their terms of employment. He
took the view that the evidence pointed to this
being the case here: N was required to attend
surgery hours; patients were allocated to her on a
random basis; she could not select her own, and
she was under the control of the practice
procedure as to when and where she did her
work.
The Appeals Officer considered that the issue as
to sending a substitute was unclear and he noted
that it had been stated that such an instance had
never arisen. However, it had been agreed that
when N was unavailable for her scheduled hours
of attendance, the practice secretary made
arrangements to cover her absence; the appellant
did not arrange the necessary cover.
The Appeals Officer observed that all doctors in
practice carry their own professional indemnity
insurance; however, this does not of itself suggest
that they are in business on their own account. A
doctor may be exposed to other risks in relation
to public liability and the safety of patients
attending the place of business or in relation to
the keeping of individual records and data. A
doctor in business on his/her own account would
be expected to take out the necessary insurance
against such risks; N did not carry such insurance
nor was she required to do so.
The question of misconduct or unprofessional
behaviour was discussed at the hearing, with the
appellant indicating that such a case would have
been a matter for the Medical Council. The
Appeals Officer noted, however, that when
pressed in relation to the possibility of continued
unacceptable behaviour, the appellant had
indicated that he would have taken steps to
ensure professional standards at the practice.
While he was not specific in relation to the steps
envisaged, the Appeals Officer considered it
reasonable to assume that N would have been
asked to leave. He observed that it was not
credible that a doctor joining the practice to gain
experience could not have been dismissed if their
behaviour had proved unacceptable.
In summary, the Appeals Officer concluded that
the essential elements of a contract of service
existed in this case: N was paid a fixed wage and
was subject to control and direction; she was
required to render personal service and could not
gain or suffer a loss from the performance of the
business. He considered that N, while engaged
by the appellant under a contract of service, was
also operating as a self-employed person outside
of the hours she was required to attend the
appellant’s practice.
Outcome
Appeal disallowed.
End of Document
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